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Article
Statisticians as
back-office policy-
makers: Counting
Asylum-Seekers and
Refugees in Europe
Funda Ustek-Spilda1,2
Abstract
Street-level bureaucracy literature ascertains that policies get made not
only in the offices of legislatures or politicians but through the discretion
bureaucrats employ in their day-to-day interactions with citizens in gov-
ernment agencies. The discretion bureaucrats use to grant access to public
benefits or impose sanctions adds up to what the public ultimately expe-
rience as the government and its policies. This perspective, however,
overlooks policy-making that gets done in the back offices of government,
where there might not be direct interaction with citizens. Furthermore, it
treats discretion as inherently anthropogenic and ignores that it is exercised
in relation to sociotechnical arrangements of which bureaucrats are a part.
In this paper, based on extensive ethnography at national statistical
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institutes and international statistical meetings across Europe, I make two
arguments. The first is that, statisticians emerge as back-office policy-
makers as they are compelled to take multiple methodological decisions
when operationalizing abstract statistical guidelines and definitions, thus
effectively making rather than merely implementing policies. This is the
“discretion” they employ, even when they may not interact with citizens.
The second argument is that the exercise of discretion is sociotechnical,
that is, it happens in relation to the constraints and affordances of tech-
nologies and the decisions of other bureaucrats in their institutions and
others.
Keywords
street-level bureaucracy, discretion, population statistics, asylum-seekers,
refugees
Introduction
The definition of population is a complex matter. In statistics, the definition
of population establishes the basis for who is to be included or excluded in
an enumeration. There are many national definitions of population (United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE] 2014, 95),1 but for
international comparison purposes, countries are recommended to use inter-
nationally harmonized definitions. One such definition is “usually resident
population” (URP), recommended by European Statistical Office (Eurostat)
for European member states and UNECE (2006, 35-39).2
The European Regulation (No 1260/2013) defines URP as “all persons
having their usual residence in a Member State at the reference time”
(European Parliament 2013, Article 2c). Here, “usual residence” is spec-
ified as “the place where a person normally spends the daily period of rest,
regardless of temporary absences for purposes of recreation, holidays,
visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious
pilgrimage” (European Parliament 2013, Article 2d). The Regulation fur-
ther sets outs that where a full twelve-month residency has not been
achieved, but individuals have “the intention to stay for at least one year,”
they should also be counted in the URP ( European Parliament 2013,
Article 2d).
At first sight, the population definition of URP and its criteria seem
rather straightforward. This is also the same impression one would get if
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they examined the metadata reports for the 2011 Census round in Europe.
Of the thirty European countries, twenty-six stated, “There are no particular
reasons for data unreliability for this topic,” when asked about the overall
accuracy they have achieved with respect to URP (Eurostat 2014). Never-
theless, the problems identified with applying the concept to national con-
texts (Lanzieri 2014) reveal that population definitions require assumptions,
adaptations, and interpretations by statisticians. As a result, we find a vari-
ety of diverging practices in European Union (EU) member states, such as
setting different time frames for measuring temporary absence or usual
residence or interpreting “intention” to stay, due to reasons of data avail-
ability or national laws and regulations that draw the boundaries of resi-
dency. These adaptations and interpretations are the focus of this paper, as I
aim to show that through them statisticians not only implement but also
make policies. They are the “discretion” employed by statisticians and the
institutions they are part of.
The concept of “discretion” in public policy was theorized by Michael
Lipsky (2010) in Street-Level Bureaucracy where he wrote that bureaucrats
in public administration emerge as policy-makers through the “discretion”
they employ in their interaction with citizens. Discretion has been concep-
tualized as the “free space” of frontline bureaucrats (Fletcher 2011, 449)
that occurs “wherever the effective limits on [the public official’s] power
leave [them] free to make a choice among possible courses of action or
inaction” (Davis 1971, cited in Evans 2011, 370). For Lipsky, the complex-
ity of tasks of street-level bureaucrats required elaboration of rules, guide-
lines, or instructions in accordance with individual circumstances and
limited resources at their disposal (Lipsky 1980, cited in Evans, 2011,
370). Then, Lipsky deduced that policies are implemented in these elabora-
tions, adapted and redefined so much so that they actually get made there.
Through their direct contact with citizens, street-level bureaucrats would
assess if and how policies, which are abstract and not specific, would apply
to individual contexts and to what extent. Through their expert assessment,
bureaucrats would have the power to enable or withhold access to the
legally defined rights and resources or impose sanctions. However, as I will
show in this paper, such an understanding of discretion ignores the increas-
ingly technical structures of government, where many policy decisions do
not involve direct contact with the subjects of government.
The idea for this paper emerged in an International Migration Statistics
Meeting in 2016 when a statistician remarked that “One has to be very
careful to stick to internationally agreed on definitions, because that’s the
only way we can compare.”3 Indeed, lack of consistency of terminology and
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methods between different countries is often described as the single most
important reason why population numbers including those on migration are
often not comparable across countries. Thus, an important part of work in
international statistics is devoted to the harmonization and standardization
of enumeration methods. Although this seems possible and straightforward
on paper, actual implementation is less so and requires statisticians to
negotiate and adapt agreed international standards and methods to fit the
established political, methodological, and technical infrastructures of their
national contexts.
Thus, I pose two questions in this paper: (1) How do statisticians oper-
ationalize abstract international concepts and definitions into their national
contexts? and (2) What are the sociotechnical practices through which this
operationalization occurs? To answer these questions, I focus on the cate-
gories of refugees and asylum-seekers, following the increasing govern-
mental concern with statistics about these groups on the European
political agenda (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, and Moore 2016; Carrera et al.
2015; Streeck 2016).
The research presented here draws on data from three years of research
as part of a research project titled ARITHMUS: How Data Make a People.
The research involved multisited, collaborative ethnography on changing
population enumeration methods in Europe. I was part of a team of
researchers4 who studied the work practices of statisticians through parti-
cipant observation and interviews across five national statistical institutes
(NSIs) in Europe and two international statistical organizations. In this
paper, I draw mainly on collaborative ethnography of the research team,
which was conducted in five countries (the Netherlands, the UK, Estonia,
Turkey, and Finland) and two international organizations (UNECE and
Eurostat). I draw in particular on material I have collected in international
meetings on migration and refugee statistics and interviews about refugee
statistics in relation to Norway and Turkey.
I make two interrelated arguments. The first is that, when operationa-
lizing abstract international statistical guidelines, definitions, and cate-
gories in relation to national rules and conventions, statisticians engage
in important negotiations with other organizations and agencies that are
involved in producing population data for policy-making. Thus, they
effectivelymake rather than just implement policies, as they adapt abstract
international guidelines to national contexts. This, I argue, is the
“discretion” they employ as bureaucrats. While they may have no direct
contact with those they are enumerating, these decisions and methodolo-
gical choices nevertheless have political implications as they shape how
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the population is enacted as an object of government. They are, therefore,
onto-political, insofar as they have consequences for public policy,
allocation of resources, and access to public services (Mol 1999). The
second is that discretion needs to be reconceived as a sociotechnical issue,
as statisticians make decisions in relation to the constraints and affor-
dances of technologies (material and technical) and the decisions of other
bureaucrats within their institutions and others. This entails that discretion
is not individualistic but that institutions also exercise discretion. This is
part of their sociotechnicality.
In what follows, I develop these arguments in four sections. First, I bring
together the work on street-level bureaucracy literature with science and
technology studies (STS) with respect to the performativity of discretion
and the sociotechnical arrangements of which it is a part (Latour 2010;
Latour and Woolgar 1986; Law 2004; Mol 2002). Second, I demonstrate
my first argument—that statisticians are compelled to employ discretion
through interpreting and adapting internationally standardized definitions to
their national contexts—through the example of URP. Third, I delve into
the specific case of asylum-seekers and refugees and address whether they
are included as part of the URP in Europe to illustrate my second argu-
ment—that discretion is sociotechnical. Fourth, building on the second
argument, I look at how institutions also exercise discretion through nego-
tiation of methods as well as other sociotechnical arrangements of their
institutions. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of
reconceptualizing discretion as sociotechnical.
Statisticians as Back-end Policy-makers: Onto-politics
of Discretion
Michael Lipsky’s work on Street-level Bureaucracy aims to solve a major
puzzle in public policy. Bureaucracy implies a set of rules and structures of
authority, but these rules need to be applied at the “street level” by those
working in schools, police and welfare departments, lower courts, legal
service offices, and other government agencies (Lipsky 2010, xi). This
entails that decisions about the dispensation of benefits or allocations of
public sanctions are made at a distance from the center by those who often
do not access to their initial formulation and legislation (Lipsky 1980).
Lipsky (1980) resolves this puzzle by pointing out the discretion street-
level bureaucrats exercise in their interaction with citizens as bureaucrats
often work in situations that are too complex to completely account for in
abstract rules, guidelines or instructions (p. 15), and they also need to
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“perform” with limited resources and high caseloads (pp. 9-10). Conse-
quently, street-level bureaucrats make policy in two related aspects. First,
they exercise wide discretion in decision-making about citizens with whom
they interact. Second, when taken together, these individual actions make
up the behavior of particular social, political, and economic structures of
government (Lipsky, 2010, 13). As such, policy-making is also located in
the encounters with citizens and not merely in legislatures or the offices of
high-ranking administrators.
Literature that followed the street-level bureaucracy theory, including its
critiques (Evans 2011; Cheetham 1993; Howe and Davies 1991), also
focused on the two concepts of discretion and interactions of street-level
bureaucrats with citizens in the making of policy. While some studies
focused on how street-level bureaucrats practice needs assessment and
eligibility (Scott 1997; Canales 2013; Ellis 2011) and illustrated how
street-level bureaucracy works in practice (Blundo 2006; Watkins-Hayes
2011; Halliday et al. 2009), others investigated the (continued) applicability
of the theory given technological advances in information technology that
formalize and structure bureaucrats’ work practices (Bovens and Zouridis
2002; Mole 2002; Canales 2011) and other changes into the organization
of their work in light of public-sector reforms (Hjo¨rne, Juhila, and Van
Nijnatten 2010; Fletcher 2011; Wastell et al. 2010; Durose 2011).
Such a focus on direct interaction in the exercise of discretion, however,
misses the discretion employed by bureaucrats in the back offices, which is
more about rulemaking for policy rather than specific decisions on individ-
ual cases. This, I argue, is the case for statisticians who may not have direct
encounters with citizens but who exercise discretion in operationalizing
abstract international statistical concepts and definitions into their own
national/local contexts through a myriad of major and minor methodologi-
cal decisions. I make this argument in relation to three conceptual positions
in STS: method, performativity, and sociotechnical arrangements.
Statisticians employ statistical methods such as censuses and surveys
that have been understood as techniques for identifying, configuring, and
assembling populations (Curtis 2001; Desrosie`res 1998). As Espeland and
Stevens (2008, 404) put it, censuses make up the categories of people such
as citizen and migrant, native and foreign-born, first- or second-generation
migrant, and so on. However, while specific statistical techniques, defini-
tions of concepts, and organization of categories are frequently discussed
and debated, as John Law (2004) argues in relation to methods more gen-
erally, a range of assumptions are naturalized and more or less hidden, such
as what is deemed important, what data are needed, and what techniques are
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appropriate for collecting that data (p. 5). Porter argues that such naturali-
zation is the result of a tension between the “disciplinary objectivity” sought
in expertise and the search for “mechanical objectivity” (Porter 1995, 4). He
notes that because a consensus is hard to reach between experts, and out-
siders need to be satisfied, mechanical objectivity is put forth as a check on
subjectivity, personal biases, or preferences, as it is “Better to speak grandly
of a rigorous method, enforced by disciplinary peers, cancelling the biases
of the knower and leading ineluctably to valid conclusions” ( Porter 1995,
4). This process, however, results in what Espeland and Stevens (2008, 421-
22) call “uncertainty absorption” as ambiguities and assumptions are
removed and discretion behind the numbers fades into the background.
Consequently, quantification practices, and their producers, are granted
authoritative and objective power, as long as they follow the rules of their
discipline, that is, its methods, concepts, and technologies (Urla 1993). But
as Law (2004), citing Wittgenstein, put it, rules do not suggest their own
application (p. 53) and when rules are applied, discrepancies emerge even
on the same object (p. 55) with different effects. This is my first critique of
how discretion is conceptualized in street-level bureaucracy literature. Sta-
tisticians (and other bureaucrats) in back offices engage in discretion
through rulemaking, through interpreting, adapting, and applying abstract
standards, guidelines, and concepts into their own national contexts.
Through this discretion, different realities are created and adjusted albeit
with greater or lesser difficulty (Law 2004, 55).
Such an understanding of reality acknowledges that “statistics do not
exist sui generis”; “they have to be created” (Law 2004, 39). This is because
scientific knowledge, technologies, and methods do not evolve in a vacuum
and are not merely techniques that describe existing realities that exist out
there (Law 2009, 240). Nor do statisticians simply identify and deploy
methods to perfectly represent an external reality. Rather, like scientific
knowledge and technologies, statistics are shaped by the historical, organi-
zational, and social contexts of the methods and practices that produce them
(Law 2004). As such, population statistics do not simply represent the
populations they are set to count, and statisticians do not merely count
populations that exist out there waiting to be identified. Instead, methods
are performative: they enact the social world they are set to describe and
represent (Law and Urry 2004; Lury and Wakeford 2012; Mol 2002; Law,
Ruppert, and Savage 2011). This is my second critique of the street-level
bureaucracy literature: that statisticians’ exercise of discretion is performa-
tive—they enact the things and people they set out to study and describe.
They do so in varying, particular ways, with varying political effects. This
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opens a political space to inquire about the circumstances that enact realities
in one way rather than other (possible) versions of the real (Law 2009; Mol
1999), which Annamarie Mol (1999) calls “ontological politics.” As such,
questions about the choice of things to measure, the classification system
used, and weighting of constitutive elements all become part of a political
process rather than a merely technical one (Engle Merry 2016, 21).
That different realities might be enacted does not mean anything goes,
implying a relativist position. Instead, it means that realities hold only
insofar as the methods that enact them have advocates and practitioners
who promote and use them and who pursue tacit political agendas that are
realized by these methods (Law, Ruppert, and Savage 2011, 12). This,
however, is no single individual’s decision. It happens in relation to and
with technologies (material and technical) and other humans. As such, they
are neither entirely social nor technical, but sociotechnical (Latour 1992).
So methods—and the sociotechnical arrangements of which they are part—
are sites where certain accounts and enactments of the world come to be
contested, negotiated, and competed over (Ruppert 2012). This is my third
critique of the conceptualization of discretion in the street-level bureau-
cracy literature: by focusing on individual decision-making, it ignores the
sociotechnical arrangements of which bureaucrats and their institutions are
a part and thereby ignores how the constraints and affordances of these
arrangements come to shape how discretion is exercised.
Through these three points, method, performativity, and sociotechnical
arrangements, I make two arguments. The first is that statisticians emerge
as back-office policy-makers when they operationalize abstract interna-
tional statistical guidelines, definitions, and methods in relation to their
national contexts; the second is that discretion needs to be reconceptualized
as sociotechnical. In the next three sections, I will illustrate these arguments
in relation to three empirical cases: (1) the internationally standardized
definition of URP, (2) counting of asylum-seekers and refugees in URP,
and (3) how institutions exercise discretion through negotiation.
Problematizing “URP”
Earlier I introduced the URP and noted that it is a population definition
recommended by Eurostat and UNECE for international comparison pur-
poses. I also noted that although URP provides seemingly straightforward
criteria for who to include and exclude from the population count, there are
a variety of diverging practices used to implement them in EU member
states. In this section, I will look at how statisticians operationalize this
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abstract international definition in relation to their national contexts in
Europe. I will look at three particular moments of interpretation and adap-
tation that takes place: (1) methods for establishing residency, (2) estab-
lishing time criteria for residency, and (3) establishing “intention” for
(continued) residency.
Methods for Establishing Residency
Although URP states that all those persons who have their usual residence
in a Member State should be counted as part of the population of that
Member State (; European Parliament 2013, Article 2c), it does not spe-
cify how “usual residence” is to be established and measured. As such,
NSIs choose between different census methods for enumerating popula-
tion in line with the sociotechnical affordances and limitations of their
own contexts.
In population statistics, there are mainly three census methods: tradi-
tional/conventional, register-based, and the combination of the two (Euro-
stat, 2014; INSEE 2015; UNECE 2007, 2008, 2012; Valente, 2010).
Traditional censuses, usually taken decennially, are based on the field enu-
meration of all individuals present in a jurisdiction (UNECE 2006, 6)
through the administration of census survey. Some countries have moved
from field enumeration to register-based census: the use of administrative
registers (UNECE 2006, 6) for establishing and counting who is resident.
Register-based censuses entail that data from multiple government depart-
ments, such as Ministry of Education, Labor, Tax Office, and so on, are
linked together to produce data. This means that the records held about a
resident, such as her tax records, education history, employment status,
marital status, and residence address, are brought together to compile a full
record about her; those records are then assembled together for an inte-
grated social, demographic, and economic view of the country (UNECE
2006, 6). When government registers do not provide information on all the
census topics for which NSIs would like to produce data (or supplement
data available in the registers), “combined” census methods are used. These
involve incorporating data from questionnaire-based surveys into the data
from administrative registers. These different methods lead to statisticians
having to make adjustments and adaptations—hence use discretion—when
they seek to implement the URP definition.
For instance, Norway conducts register-based censuses, which enables
them to count the residents of the Norwegian prison (Norgerhaven) based in
the Netherlands as part of the Norwegian resident population. As a
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Norwegian statistician put it, this is because the prisoners are not staying in
that facility “out of their own will” but out of obligation.5 Having informa-
tion about prison residents in the population register entails that those who
are physically residing in another country can be included in the population
through adjustments to the data held at registers. If Norway were to conduct
a traditional census survey, the same population of prison residents would
not be included in Norway’s population count, as the prison is located
outside of the country’s national jurisdiction.
In another example, Estonian statisticians developed a “residency index”
(RI) to calculate the probability of the actual residency of individuals in the
country based on the amount of transactions they make with government
agencies (Tiit and Maasing 2016). When a child is born, she is registered in
the birth register; when she goes to school, she is added to the education
register; when she takes up employment, she is then included in the employ-
ment and tax registers, and so on. The more “signs of life” she has in
registers, the higher the likelihood that she is resident in the country.6
However, this means that individuals who do not interact much with gov-
ernment agencies, such as those living in rural areas and not holding formal
employment, might end up being excluded from the URP if their RI falls
below a certain probability threshold.7
Establishing residency requires important interpretations and adjust-
ments by statisticians—how lives appear in data and are lived may not
always be one and the same. As a Norwegian statistician put it, people
may be living at addresses different to those at which they are legally
registered to reside (as in the case of students); they might have moved
abroad and never notified the authorities about their move or they died but
their records were not updated. Hence, the information held at registers
may not always be up-to-date, with the implication that those who are no
longer resident in the country end up being counted in URP or those who
are resident but do not produce sufficient “signs of life” in registers may
be excluded from the count.8 These examples illustrate that statisticians
are compelled to establish rules not only about which methods they will
employ to produce statistics but also about how these methods will inter-
pret, make adjustments to, and adapt the international definitions and their
criteria to their own contexts.
Establishing Time Criteria for Residency
URP sets out a twelve-month criterion for establishing “usual” residency
and specifies that temporary absences do not entail a change of residency.
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Despite being a quantitative criterion, the existing sociotechnical arrange-
ments of which statisticians and their institutions are part lead to adjust-
ments and adaptations to this seemingly “exact” criterion.
For instance, while France, Germany, and Norway implement a six-
month residency criterion to be included in URP, Austria excludes all
those who have been absent from the country for more than “ninety days”
(Eurostat 2014). Similarly, the Netherlands notes that for those individuals
who are enumerated in a census survey but not registered in the population
register, a stay of at least two months is sufficient to determine their usual
residence (Eurostat 2014).
Moreover, for certain groups of individuals, exceptions are made so as to
lift or adjust the time criterion in order to comply with national laws and
regulations that draw the boundaries between residents and nonresidents. In
line with national directives, members of the army, police authorities, and
diplomatic service members who are posted abroad (and their family mem-
bers who reside with them), for instance, are included in the URP of their
countries of citizenship rather than countries of residence (Eurostat 2014).
In contrast, students studying abroad might be included in the URP count
depending on their marital status (e.g., Norway), level of education (e.g.,
Romania), place of residency for the majority of the study period (e.g., the
UK), or they might be excluded (e.g., Poland; Eurostat 2014).
These examples illustrate that even when the criteria specified in an
international definition are quantitative and seemingly exact, statisticians
are compelled to adapt them to their own national contexts in line with the
methods and data available to them and the national laws and regulations
that determine who is a resident.
Establishing “Intention” for (Continued) Residency
Although URP sets a twelve-month rule for establishing residency, it recog-
nizes that some people might not be able to fulfill it, especially if they
recently moved. Hence, the intention to stay for at least one year is proposed
to include those in the URP with the intention of continued residency. It is,
however, difficult to measure intention. Hence, statisticians are compelled
to make assumptions and adjustments to implement this rule.
Hungary reports that international students who have studied in the
country for less than a year will be assumed to “have the will to stay for
more than twelve months” and will be included in the URP (Eurostat
2014).9 Similarly, a statistician in a meeting on migration statistics noted
that the intention of international students to stay on after their courses was
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assumed. As he noted, students tend either not to respond or to underreport
their plans to stay after their studies in migration surveys, as they fear their
answers could be held against them.10 Belgium also specifically states that
“It is impossible to know whether [individuals] intend to stay in the country
in the following twelve months,” and henceforth assumes intention to stay
(Eurostat 2014).
Street-level bureaucracy literature focuses on the individual decisions
that frontline bureaucrats make in their contact with citizens. As such, it
pays attention to the “free space” bureaucrats might utilize to apply an
abstract policy to the specific circumstances of a citizen. This focus on
direct interaction for the exercise of discretion overlooks two important
points. The first is that bureaucrats in the back offices, such as statisticians
who may not have direct interaction with citizens, also employ discretion.
Their discretion is less about deciding on individual cases but more about
establishing rulemaking in adapting abstract international statistical con-
cepts, definitions, and regulations in relation to their national contexts.
Through their rulemaking, statisticians also not only implement but also
make policies, since the rules they decide on shape and enact how the
population they set to count and represent come to be known. The second
point is that street-level bureaucracy literature conceives of discretion as
individualistic, that is, it happens between a bureaucrat and a citizen. How-
ever, the variety of interpretations, assumptions, and adjustments made by
statisticians in adapting URP to their own contexts demonstrates that sta-
tisticians are not sovereign in making decisions. The institutions they are
part of shape (enable and restrict) how and in which ways they use discre-
tion. In the next section, I will continue building on this latter point through
an analysis of how a particular group of population, refugees, and asylum-
seekers are counted in the URP.
Are Refugees and Asylum-seekers Part of the URP?
During the peak of the refugee crisis, the numbers of people seeking refuge
in Europe became particularly contentious. While some politicians referred
to these groups as “swarms of people” (BBC 2015) and questioned their
need for protection by asking whether they were “economic migrants”
(Buckley 2016), others pushed for increasing quotas for refugees in their
countries (Carrera et al. 2015). In such a climate, statisticians noted that
they often found themselves trying to maintain a tricky balance between
providing good quality statistics, while keeping their professional indepen-
dence by not being involved in the politics of the issue.11 However, such
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statements ignore that the social contexts within which statistics are pro-
duced also have political dimensions, as the produced knowledge has the
capacity to shape decisions of governance (Engle Merry 2016, 209). In this
section, I will develop the second argument of the paper: discretion is
sociotechnical; it happens in relation to and with technologies (material
and technical) and other humans, with political effects. I will illustrate this
argument through the case of differential assignment of personal identifi-
cation numbers (PINs) to asylum-seekers and refugees12 in Norway.
The recommendations for the 2010 Round of Censuses state:
Persons who may be illegal, irregular or undocumented migrants should be
included in the resident population and should follow the same rules of usual
residence for other persons. ( . . . ) Asylum-seekers and persons who have
applied for or been granted refugee status or similar types of international
protection should be included in the resident population if the duration of stay
in the country is, or is expected to be, at least 12 months as for the rest of the
population. This also applies when persons are granted temporary protection
in situations of mass displacement but where a formal status of protection has
not yet been granted due to practical considerations. ( . . . ) The intention is not
to distinguish these persons separately but rather to ensure that they are not
missed from the enumeration. (UNECE 2006, 40-41)13
Despite the clarity of the recommendation for treating asylum-seekers
and refugees the same as the rest of the population, a brief look into its
application reveals that all European countries include refugees, but more
countries exclude asylum-seekers from their URP than include them (17
and 15, respectively, see Table 1).
Although an asylum application might have many potential outcomes,
the enumeration of individuals who go through this process is organized
only by their asylum-seeker status (awaiting decision on their asylum appli-
cation) and refugee status (acceptance of their application). This binary
labeling, however, does not reveal the complexity of the asylum process.
When a person applies for asylum, her application might be accepted and
she might be given internationally recognized refugee status or temporary/
subsidiary protection or it might be rejected. If rejected, she might appeal,
and if her appeal is also rejected, she might continue appealing until her
appeal routes are exhausted (Zetter 2007; Wettergren and Wikstro¨m 2014).
At that point, she might be returned or she might be allowed to remain in the
country if her return goes against the international principle of nonrefoule-
ment: not returning asylum-seekers to a country where they might face
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persecution (UNHCR 1977). Moreover, in exceptional circumstances, mass
protection status might also be given, as has been the case for Syrians in
Turkey during the peak of the Syrian conflict (Ustek-Spilda 2017).
On the surface, the simplification used in statistics is a result of the
presumed difficulty of covering all instances and kinds of people, as coun-
tries use different classifications with specific legal and administrative
applications (EGRIS 2017). However, these legal and administrative dif-
ferences (and the different classifications used by different government
Table 1. Member States and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Countries
by Inclusion/Exclusion of Asylum-seekers and Refugees in the Data on Population
Reported to Eurostat in the Framework of the Unified Demographic Data
Collection, Reference Year 2015.
Population as
of January 1,
2016
Asylum-seekers Refugees
Included Excluded Included Excluded
Conventional
census
(including
rolling-
census)
Ireland, Greece,
Italy, Cyprus,
Luxembourg,
France,
Portugal, the
UK
Bulgaria,
Croatia,
Hungary,
Romania,
Slovakia
Ireland, Greece,
Italy, Cyprus,
Luxembourg,
France, Portugal,
the UK, Bulgaria,
Croatia,
Hungary,
Romania,
Slovakia
Register-based
census
Belgium, Austria Finland,
Sweden,
Norway,
Denmark,
Slovenia
Belgium, Austria,
Finland, Sweden,
Iceland, Norway,
Denmark,
Slovenia
Combined
method
census
Germany, Spain,
Estonia, the
Netherlands,
Switzerland
Czech
Republic,
Latvia,
Lithuania,
Malta,
Poland,
Lichtenstein
Germany, Spain,
Estonia, the
Netherlands,
Switzerland,
Czech Republic,
Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland,
Lichtenstein
Source: Table adapted from Eurostat (2017) International Migration Statistics, Reference
Metadata in Euro SDMZ Metadata Structure, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/
migr_immi_esms.htm, accessed on June 21, 2019.
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departments and international organizations) comprise the sociotechnical
arrangements that enable one group (refugees) to be counted in URP while
restricting others (asylum-seekers) as in the case of Norway.
In Norway, the source of population data is the Central Population Reg-
ister. To be registered as resident, a person should have lived, or have the
intention to do so, for at least six months in Norway (Eurostat 2014).
Residents are issued a PIN, which grants them rights and access to a variety
of public and private services. The PIN connects all the records held about
residents across different government registers.
The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) issues the PIN, then
the data are shared with Statistics Norway, which compiles population data
for the purposes of doing a census. During this transfer, the information on
refugees is passed onto Statistics Norway (as they have a PIN), but not for
asylum-seekers (as they lack a PIN). Under normal circumstances, individ-
uals who reside in Norway for longer than six months are issued PINs. For
asylum-seekers, duration of the application process does not change the rule
that they are not issued PINs. Consequently, refugees are included in the
URP as they are assigned PINs, but asylum-seekers are excluded.
The exclusion of asylum-seekers from the population count is presented
as a technical matter for the statistical office. As another organization, UDI
issues the PIN, and since the statistical office only receives information
about those individuals with a PIN, they end up excluding asylum-seekers
from the population enumeration. A statistician from UDI explained the
reasoning behind this practice. He noted that the police department takes the
initial registrations of asylum applications, but sometimes, due to an error,
the same person can be registered twice or some asylum-seekers might
purposefully lodge multiple applications in the country (or across different
countries), which is considered “asylum shopping” by authorities. As the
Dublin system14 establishes that asylum-seekers would be returned to the
initial country of asylum application, issuing them with PIN numbers would
be too costly to administer, as “some of these people could be sent back”
and some would return voluntarily or move to other countries.15 Another
statistician from Statistics Norway also stressed the potential cost of includ-
ing asylum-seekers in the population and noted that it would be
“overwhelming” and “not productive” given the limited resources of sta-
tistical offices.16 He then added that this is why strict compliance with the
URP definition was not feasible for Norway: it would be too expensive to
make these changes to the way the population registration is done and the
registers kept, especially given the small number of asylum-seekers.17
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This example illustrates that discretion is exercised in relation to the
counting of asylum-seekers involves the interplay between a technol-
ogy—the PIN—which is implemented by a government agency other than
the NSI (i.e., UDI) and statisticians and UDI bureaucrats. As such, it
shows that discretion is not merely technical but sociotechnical; it hap-
pens in relation to and with technologies (material and technical) and
other humans. This is my second critique of the conceptualization of
discretion in street-level bureaucracy: by focusing on individual
decision-making, it ignores the sociotechnical arrangements of which
bureaucrats and their institutions are a part. But bureaucrats are not out-
side of these sociotechnical arrangements that extend to their particular
offices and methods. This is why it would be “too costly” to try to alter
them, as doing so would require uprooting an enormous hinterland of not
only the institutions they are part of but the material and technical ele-
ments that comprise the government registers, PINs, and the welfare pol-
icies and sanctions that are sustained through them.
The Norwegian example illustrates two further points in relation to STS.
First, discretion is performative: it ends up enacting the social world it is set
to describe and represent. The exclusion of asylum-seekers from the pop-
ulation enumeration entails that even when they are “resident” in Norway,
they are not part of the Norwegian population and are unable to access
public services as other residents in the country. Second, the decision to
exclude asylum-seekers from the population count is onto-political (Mol
1999), as it means that they are unable to access public services or the
allocation of resources. In the next section, I will look at negotiations
between different government departments for data and resources and how
they align their classification systems and methods. My aim is to illustrate
that not only individuals, but also institutions, exercise discretion. This is
part of their sociotechnicality.
Institutions and Discretion
In the previous section, I noted that because asylum-seeker numbers were
small in Norway, statisticians argued that excluding them from the popu-
lation count was not a major issue.18 The small numbers argument, how-
ever, would not hold for Turkey, which, according to UNHCR figures, hosts
3.5 million refugees, currently the highest number in any country in the
world (UNHCR 2018). Previously, Turkey was deemed a “transit” country
for asylum-seekers, as they would log asylum applications to the UNHCR
and stay only until given refugee status elsewhere (Kiris¸ci 2014; _Ic¸duygu
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2015). Up until the 2000 Census, Turkey held traditional censuses. This
meant that all those present on the census day were counted in the popula-
tion. However, because the census survey did not include any questions
about asylum applications or refugee status, it was not possible to identify
refugees and/or asylum-seekers within the overall population count.19 Tur-
key held its first combined-method census in 2010, but the number of
asylum-seekers and refugees was not considered a relevant problem at that
time. “The issue began,” as one statistician put it, when Turkey opened its
borders to Syrians in the peak of the conflict, when Syrians were allowed to
enter without passports and any form of initial registration.20 It was also
during the peak of the crisis that the Turkish Directorate for Migration
Management (DGMM) was founded to manage all migration-related mat-
ters, and Turkey started the switch from a combined-method toward a full
register-based census by 2020. As a consequence of both changes, to pro-
duce information for URP and other internationally agreed topics and cate-
gories on migration, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) needed
DGMM to share their data with them.
Indeed, DGMM often shares the details of the number of asylum appli-
cations that the agency processes, and having made receiving social benefits
conditional on registration, it can be said that they have up-to-date infor-
mation on asylum-seekers and refugees in the country.21 Nevertheless, as a
humanitarian agency worker in a refugee statistics meeting noted, for sta-
tistics, they need more than mere numbers; they need to decompose num-
bers into categories such as age, sex, language, education level, and so on.22
Only when they have these details, they can meet humanitarian demands in
a timely and efficient manner, he added.
Also, even though DGMM was responsible for migration management,
it was still TurkStat that had the mandate to produce migration statistics.23
In a meeting held with various government agencies involved with migra-
tion matters in Turkey, it became apparent that TurkStat was having diffi-
culty producing numbers. This was due not only to lack of access to timely
and up-to-date data from DGMM and other government agencies but also
due to incompatible classification practices, confusions about what each
institution is responsible for, and varying levels of expertise for statistical
data production among the agencies, which resulted in conflicting accounts
on the same topics or large amounts of missing data. Statisticians at Turk-
Stat expressed that it is their responsibility to “establish the ordering of
the(se) administrative data held by different institutions” and to take those
that are “the most accurate.”24
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Bureaucrats attending the meeting pointed out that the observable dif-
ferences between the data held by different government departments are
also a result of the particular circumstances of asylum-seekers and refugees,
where data might not always be available or compatible. As one bureaucrat
explained:
For demographic information, we look at the passport they used when they
were entering the country. For illegal entries, their testimony/declaration is
principal. But yeah, at this point, it might be a guessing-game sometimes. If
the guy has 10 children, perhaps he does not remember the exact birthdate of
each of them. Or perhaps these data were entered back in the day and their
format does not fit into our current system anymore, so it might not be read
easily or immediately. And sometimes, let’s face it, there are discrepancies
between the countries’ data management systems as well. The system of the
country that entered the (passport) data to begin with is very important. For
instance, in Afghanistan, their birthdate is entered as 1-1-1, this is because
they have a registration system like that. If someone does not know how to
read this system, then they might enter some other detail.25
We see that there are many moments of “guessing” in the enumeration of
asylum-seekers and refugees who bring with them the sociotechnical
arrangements of the places they come from: their classification, numbering
systems, formats for recording demographic information, and so on. When
these arrangements conflict, “missing cases” emerge in government regis-
ters, even when those persons might be present in the country, or “missing
data” emerge, even when the data might be recorded somewhere in some
unrecognized format.
Even when data are accessed, the question of drawing the boundaries for
inclusion and exclusion in the population involves a political decision.
TurkStat statisticians discussed the implications of including Syrians who
were given temporary protection in the population count, if they fulfilled
the six-month residency criteria. One statistician highlighted the higher
fertility rate of Syrian women in comparison to Turkish women, noting that
the population composition would significantly change, given the size of
the Syrian population in the country. She also added that population projec-
tions for the next ten, twenty, and fifty years would also be significantly
altered, if they would “all” be included in the population count.26
The difficulties with the migration data held in government databases,
however, resulted in only those who were “registered” to be counted in the
population. As a statistician explained, this amounted to only a tiny group of
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those under protection, as (at the time of fieldwork) only those residing in
dedicated camps were registered, and the majority lived outside of camps.27
There are important policy implications of this enumeration, as the public
administration of funds and services need to take into consideration local
population size for things such as opening (new) schools and hospitals,
appointment of teachers and doctors, as well as constructing new housing,
managing waste systems, and water and food supplies.28
Although in the European context NSIs are given the right to access
administrative registers for statistical purposes (European Commission
2012), in practice, this access varies widely as illustrated in the case of
Turkey. Migration data are considered sensitive, since it is often held by
border police or designated migration management authorities. The
recent political debates that make border security a national issue, and
reducing migration numbers (Holmes and Castan˜eda 2016), make having
access to these registers ever more political. Against that background,
statisticians are compelled to set “the standard for developing, producing
and disseminating ( . . . ) European official statistics” (Eurostat 2011),
hence establish the rules of how they make adjustments to their methods
in line with the Code of Practice that they share as European statisticians.
This involves negotiating access and working with data and registers that
are produced, organized, and updated by other government departments;
it also requires that they abide by the effectiveness and credibility of
their statistical authority through a commitment to principles such as
professional independence, impartiality and objectivity, and quality
(Eurostat 2011).
Thus, building on the argument that discretion is sociotechnical, I argue
that both individuals and institutions exercise discretion. This is part of
their sociotechnicality. The classification systems, data practices, and
technical infrastructure affordances of various government registers, and
the bureaucrats who produce, update, and enable access to them, demon-
strate that statisticians do not make decisions as isolated individuals. The
negotiation that takes place between the institutions in the process of
implementing abstract international rules and recommendations is socio-
technical: it depends on what the methods and technical infrastructures do
and do not enable.
Conclusion
Statistical knowledge is often ascribed a level of objectivity that stands
above politics. Yet, as Sally Engle Marry (2016) puts it, “one effect of
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power is what gets measured,” and what gets measured depends on what is
deemed to be important politically (p. 29). The Expert Group on Refugee
Statistics, which I have followed for the last three years for this research,
has come into being only in 2015, but the term “refugee” was coined
during the Refugee Convention of 1951. Also, the Group’s first meeting
location, Turkey, was/is a major refugee-hosting country during this cri-
sis, with a special agreement with the EU for hosting refugees.29 The
systematic measurement of the group became important, however, only
when asylum-seekers targeted the EU countries as their destination in
large numbers. In other words, refugee statistics emerged as a separate
field of migration statistics only when the issue became important in the
EU’s political agenda.
Given this context, it is difficult to deny the political character of refugee
and asylum-seeker numbers; once made into statistics, the “political” in
data is camouflaged, and the political considerations that went into the
choice of definitions, categories, and methods, as well as assumptions and
motivations, become authoritative numbers. However, once the numbers
are established and circulated, the politics of how they come to be produced
is erased; and the politics is analyzed only with respect to the policy-
making. This is what I challenged in this paper.
Despite claims of objectivity, statistics are built on a plethora of deci-
sions, negotiations, adaptations, and interpretations; subtly and sometimes
unconsciously shaped by the assumptions, motivations, and concerns of
those who carry them out (Engle Marry 2016, 19-20). As such, statisticians
emerge as back-office policy-makers rather than merely implementers of
policies. They exercise discretion as they adapt abstract international def-
initions into their local contexts, deciding on exceptions and exclusions
while also drawing the boundaries of who and what comes to be counted
and how. In counting refugees, but not asylum-seekers, for instance, they do
not just produce numbers on a subgroup of population. They render one
group visible and accountable, while making another invisible (their needs
for protection, shelter, and access to education or the labor market are also
rendered invisible).
Moreover, the discretion that goes into the production of statistics is
sociotechnical. It is exercised in relation to the constraints and affordances
of technologies and in relation to other bureaucrats within and outside
statisticians’ organizations. As such, it displaces responsibility for deci-
sions. The more complex the infrastructures of decision-making and the
larger the relations that sustain them, the more difficult it becomes to
challenge them. As the ambiguities in categorization, missing data, and
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incommensurability disappear from the numbers presented (Engle Merry
2016, 19-20), they appear more accurate and precise than they are. In a
world where direct contact with the subjects of government is increasingly
declining and replaced by automated decision-making systems deemed
more objective, impartial, and unambiguous, it is important to recognize
the discretion that goes into building the techniques of government. Rather
than standing above politics, these techniques create the world they attempt
to measure and represent.
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Notes
1. Although all European member states produce population counts based on the
usually resident population, multiple population counts still exist. For instance,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, and Switzerland continue to use three separate pop-
ulation definitions (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
[UNECE] 2014, 98) and other countries also producing statistics based on the
“registered” population definition (e.g., Norway, Finland).
2. UNECE recommendations are for guidance only to member states, whereas
Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) member states are required
to follow their recommendations.
3. Field notes, UNECE and Eurostat Migration Statistics Meeting (MigStat), May
18-20, 2016, Geneva, Switzerland.
4. ARITHMUS team members are: Professor Evelyn Ruppert (Principal
Investigator), Dr. Francisca Gromme´, Dr. Stephan Scheel, Dr. Baki Cakici, and
Dr. Ville Takala. Further information on the project can be obtained from
the website arithmus.eu.
5. Interview, Statistics Norway, September 2016.
6. Interview, Statistics Estonia, March 2016.
7. Interview, Statistics Estonia, March 2016.
8. Interview, Statistics Norway, April 2016.
9. Reference has been taken from https://ec.europa.eu/CensusHub2/metadata.do,
Hungary, 3.4. Statistical Concepts and Definitions—usual residence, accessed
December 12, 2018.
10. Field notes, Conference on the Migration Statistics User Forum, Home Office,
London, September 21, 2016.
11. Field notes, Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statis-
tics (EGRIS) Meeting 2017 in Oslo, Norway.
12. A refugee is someone “who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons for race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country” (EGRIS 2018, 20). Asylum-seeker is not a legal term per se,
but “a general term for someone who is claiming or applying for protection as
a refugee and who has not received a final decision on his or her claim. It can
also refer to someone who has not yet submitted an application for refugee
status recognition (has not yet formalised the administrative requirements in
national law) but may nevertheless be in need of international protection”
(p. 22).
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13. The recommendations for the 2000 Census round suggested the inclusion of
refugees but exclusion of asylum-seekers (UNECE 2008, 74). Note that this was
changed for the 2010 Census round.
14. Dublin Regulation establishes the European Member State responsible for the
assessment of an asylum application. The Regulation considers the country
where the initial entry was made from as the responsible country. Other criteria
for establishing responsibility include family considerations and possession of
recent visa or residence permit in a Member State (https://ec.europa.eu/home-a
ffairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants_en, accessed
December 26, 2018).
15. Interview, Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, April 28, 2017.
16. Interview, Statistics Norway, March 2017.
17. Interview, Statistics Norway, March 2017.
18. Interview, Statistics Norway, April 2017.
19. Informal communication, TurkStat, November 2015.
20. Informal communication, TurkStat, November 2015.
21. Directorate for Migration Management’s website gives exact figures on various
types of migration, including entry–exit rates, residence permits, temporary
protection, and return statistics of asylum applicants (http://www.goc.gov.tr/i
cerik/migration-statistics_915_1024, accessed January 5, 2019). These statis-
tics do not, however, include any details other than aggregate number and
country of origin. The number of asylum applications that have been accepted
is also not specified, other than temporary protection.
22. Field notes, EGRIS 2015.
23. Field notes, TurkStat, December 2015.
24. Field notes, TurkStat, December 2015.
25. Field notes, TurkStat, December 2015.
26. Informal communication, TurkStat, November 2015.
27. Field notes, TurkStat, December 2015.
28. Informal communication, EGRIS 2015.
29. See EU-Turkey Statement to end irregular migration flows from Turkey to the
EU (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/poli
cies/european-agenda-migration/20180314_eu-turkey-two-years-on_en.pdf,
accessed May 5, 2019).
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